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Polycentric governance involves multiple actors at multiple scales beyond the
state. The potential of polycentric governance for promoting both climate mitiga-
tion and adaptation is well established. Yet, dominant conceptualizations of poly-
centric governance pay scant attention to how power dynamics affect the
structure and the outcomes of climate action. We review emerging evidence on
power within polycentric and distributed governance across the climate, forestry,
marine, coastal, urban, and water sectors, and relate them to established posi-
tions on power within research on federalism, decentralization, international
relations, and networked governance. We develop a typology of design, prag-
matic, and framing power that focuses on how and in whose interests power is
mobilized to achieve outcomes. We propose that the conceptual model helps to
explain power dynamics across different sectors and across both climate change
mitigation and adaptation. Significant research challenges arising from the analy-
sis include the measurement and monitoring of the outcomes of power asymme-
tries over time. © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
Deliberate strategies to address environmentalchange are critical for achieving long-term envi-
ronmental sustainability. In climate change policy, stra-
tegies are needed to address episodic and extreme events
such as wildfires, droughts, floods, and heatwaves, as
well as the long-term interactions between climatic and
socioenvironmental processes. For the past few decades,
a number of models to govern and manage these issues
have emerged, ranging from traditional forms of gov-
ernance (e.g., markets, communities, and governments)
to hybrid forms of governance (e.g., public–private part-
nerships, concessionary mechanisms, and community-
based interventions). New multilevel approaches seek to
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avoid the pitfalls and limitations of earlier approaches
and to advance governance toward desirable norms
such as local participation, representation, equity, legiti-
macy, accountability, innovation, and efficiency.1,2
More recently, polycentric governance has increasingly
gained traction among both scholars and
policymakers.3
Polycentrism is a model of governance that
actively steers local, regional, national, and interna-
tional actors and instigates learning from experience
across multiple actors, levels of decision-making, and
temporal scales.3,4 In its most prevalent conceptuali-
zation, it is a nonhierarchical set of interactions
between public and private actors operating at multi-
ple levels (e.g., supranational, national, and subna-
tional) without a predominant central authority.5 A
polycentric system is made up of many autonomous
units that are formally independent of one another
but which choose to act in ways that take account of
others through self-organized processes of coopera-
tion and conflict resolution.6,7
Yet recent critiques have highlighted several
inherent contradictions and limitations of polycentr-
ism. Jordan et al.8 challenge the prevailing enthusi-
asm about polycentric governance in dealing with
climate change, pointing out untested assumptions
about diffusion and performance of novel govern-
ance approaches. Other research reveals the limita-
tions of polycentric governance for arresting the
world’s alarming deforestation rates through pro-
grams such as Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation (REDD+).9 Evidence
from polycentric experiments in urban planning for
climate change has underscored the challenges in
engaging with the economic and political dimensions
of cities.10,11. Some strands have alluded to the role
that power may play in undermining the advantages
of polycentrism over other forms of governance.12,13
At the heart of conceptualizations of poly-
centric governance is the focus on the emergence of
decentralized yet networked arrangements that are
connected through processes of cooperative learning.
However, by downplaying the hierarchical or multi-
level structures within which polycentrism is
embedded, these frameworks often ignore not only
different types of power at play but also how their
distribution may affect both governance processes
and environmental outcomes. Empirical research
shows that many systems that are described as poly-
centric are critically shaped by power, both positively
and negatively. For example, forest policy under the
REDD+ program, which is generally regarded as
polycentric, is actually embedded within established
hierarchies of centralized control and state ownership
of forest land.9 Similarly, empirical research on
REDD+ in Indonesia shows that powerful organiza-
tions can and do shape governance structures to their
own interests.14 Moreover, the conceptualization of
polycentrism as self-organizing and nonhierarchical
can be problematic when the state is in effect a part-
ner in most governance schemes.2,15 Indeed, the liter-
ature on decentralization and community-based
management of natural resources often exposes the
inherent contradictions of purposefully ‘choosing’ to
self-organize, and shows that the changing relation-
ships of power at all levels are critical to understand-
ing outcomes.16,17 Finally, some studies suggest that
multiscale governance of environmental risks and
adaptation is better conceptualized as both decentra-
lized networks of cooperative learning and as expres-
sions of power-laden social relations.18
Polycentric governance is often equated with
state decentralization of authority in order to keep
central power in check.19,20 By limiting central
power, polycentrism is purported to avoid the fail-
ures of state-centered governance while simultane-
ously empowering different actors and organizations
to work together across and at the appropriate scale
to solve critical environmental problems. Yet, it
appears that in the pursuit of minimal active manage-
ment by the state, polycentrism has been inadvert-
ently rendered power-free. We believe that in order
for polycentrism to meet its promise, its analysis and
practice need to be much more explicit about power
in order to both reveal and address power imbal-
ances and achieve better outcomes.
In this article, we explore these issues, focusing
particularly on the role of power in polycentric gov-
ernance. We first show how existing work on poly-
centric governance has generated significant new
understanding but how it still needs to incorporate
the different ways of accounting for power. We then
employ insights from a number of recent studies
across the climate, forestry, marine, coastal, urban,
and water sectors, and relate them to the findings
that have emerged from much older strands of work
on federalism, decentralization, international rela-
tions, and networked governance. In particular, we
explore the diverse strands of literature in order to
identify different forms of power and how they may
affect processes and outcomes of polycentric govern-
ance. We show the potential for deeper collabora-
tion across a number of disciplines and multiple
conceptualizations of power in order to produce a
more comprehensive analysis of polycentric govern-
ance. In the concluding section, we outline the most
significant research gaps identified from our
analysis.
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WHAT IS POLYCENTRIC
GOVERNANCE?
At first glance, it is possible that any and every
arrangement with multiple actors governing across
different scales could claim to be polycentric since
the degree of coordination and level of purposeful
design might lie in the eye of the beholder. For exam-
ple, the European Union has often been understood
as both a multilevel system and a polycentric system.
Hence, establishing some core examples of what
represents ideal types of polycentric governance, and
contrasting them with examples that clearly are not,
can be difficult.
Polycentricity was initially defined as the antith-
esis of monocentric systems: those controlled by a
single unitary state power (e.g., a comprehensive gov-
ernmental authority).6 By contrast, an ideal-type
polycentric system comprises multiple governing
authorities at different scales who do not stand in
hierarchical relationship to each other but function
nonetheless as a coordinated system.3,5 These indi-
vidual authorities take account of others through
processes of cooperation, conflict resolution, self-
organization, and mutual adjustment. Polycentric
systems are also not to be confused with ideal-type
multilevel systems, which involve a nested structure
with a central predominant government authority
whose decision-making is based on constituent inter-
ests (e.g., lower level authorities).21 In multilevel sys-
tems, tasks and decisions are allocated according to a
classic federal structure or decentralized unitary
structure, where different actors at different scales
are responsible for different policy problems. Poly-
centric systems share more characteristics with net-
worked governance systems, which are also
characterized by a nonhierarchical yet interactive
constellation of public and private actors at multiple
levels (e.g., supranational, national, and subnational)
without a central predominant authority.10,22 It is
also worth noting here that fragmented systems can
also exhibit dense networks,23 but they lack self-
organization and mutual adjustment which are the
defining features of polycentric systems (Table 1).
Finally, it should be acknowledged that all of these
categories are ideal types that are not exclusive of
each other and do not necessary function in the ideal
way in practice.
Polanyi first introduced the concept of poly-
centric governance in his classic 1951 text, The Logic
of Liberty.24 Vincent Ostrom developed the concept
further in his 1961 study of metropolitan govern-
ance.6 Over the last decade, the significant influence
of Elinor Ostrom and colleagues’ work on
nonmonocentric collective-action solutions for the
provision of environmental goods and services has
seen the polycentric model gain important traction in
climate, resilience, and adaptation studies.7,25–27 This
strand of literature includes several important
demonstrations of how small-scale or single resource-
use systems have scaled up over time in response to
relatively simple common use rules nested within
polycentric systems.
These studies highlight that multiple centers of
decision-making can and do interact at many different
scales. However, due to a lack of empirical data, meas-
urement challenges, and problems of attribution, early
work on polycentric environmental governance often
took a normative or descriptive case-study approach to
understanding polycentric systems.7,28 The results
remained largely descriptive (complexity as the new
reality) or normative (complexity should be solved
through bottom-up adaptation and participation
across institutional contexts).29
More recently, polycentricity in environmental
governance has been conceptualized as ranging from
weak coordination to strong polycentric order
(Figure 1). Monocentricity and polycentricity are
extremes, with many systems existing on a contin-
uum between them.7 Strong polycentric order is asso-
ciated with a high dispersion of power. The degree of
order is explained by concurrence of social capital,
leadership, communication dynamics, negotiation of
trade-offs, degree of formalization, and structural
patterns of networks such as scale bridging and
coordination.33,34
However, while this approach provides useful
insights into analysis of internal social structures and
processes of polycentric governance, the empirical lit-
erature is only beginning to address the strength and
authority of macrolevel political institutions.35 Hui-
tema et al.28 attribute this gap to the normative and
pragmatic underpinning of polycentric governance
which judges that local self-government is best. The
principle of subsidiarity—that government functions
best at the lowest feasible level—is often invoked in
order to limit the power and responsibility of higher
TABLE 1 | Defining Characteristics of Polycentric Governance
Systems
• Many autonomous units formally independent of one another
• Multiple overlapping scales
• Units choose to act in ways that take account of others
(though mutual adjustment)
• Self-organized processes of cooperation and conflict resolution
• System-like behavior
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levels in favor of promoting strong, independent roles
at local and regional levels.34,36 Yet, central to the
claims made for polycentricity are multiscale issues
of power and responsibility. Indeed, multiscale power
dynamics can move polycentric regimes between
decentralized, recentralized, and fragmented states
over time, with implications for both the structure of
the system and its ability to achieve outcomes.37
Understanding such polycentric power dynamics,
however, is neither easy nor straightforward. As the
study of polycentricity matures, there is a pressing
need for a more analytic interrogation of not only
how power is distributed across polycentric systems
but also how power is mobilized to achieve effective
systems and how it affects policy and management
design.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a robust and
active debate has begun to emerge concerning the
power dynamics of polycentric environmental gov-
ernance, spanning the international climate, urban,
forestry, coastal, and marine sectors. This debate is
provocative because it is beginning to question the
efficacy of polycentric governance in a field that has
long tended to be overly exuberant about the prom-
ise of polycentrism. Emerging critiques highlight how
the focus on soft interventions (nudging behavior,
devolution of responsibilities, fiscal incentives) in
polycentric governance has precluded more interven-
tionist approaches and failed to deal with issues such
as power imbalances and social and ecological jus-
tice. However, we suggest that the task challenging
scholars of ‘the new critical polycentrism’7–9,38 is to
develop a framework to identify and understand
power and its implications. As a first step, next, we
revisit why polycentric governance is important for
adaptation, resilience, and transformation.
WHY POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE IS
IMPORTANT FOR CLIMATE
MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION
Environmental variability and change are character-
ized by cross-scale (spatial and temporal) linkages
and feedbacks that generate nonlinear dynamics and
uncertainty. These linkages and feedbacks cross
boundaries, cause complex social–ecological interac-
tions, and generate problems of institutional fit
(Table 2). In such situations, the transformative
potential of polycentric governance has been persua-
sively argued and widely advocated.3,4 Figure 2, for
example, shows that there has been exponential
growth of scientific interest in polycentric governance
since Elinor Ostrom spearheaded an intellectual cam-
paign exploring the potential of polycentric govern-
ance to address global climate change.
There are many core arguments regarding the
importance of polycentric systems. First, a polycentric
FIGURE 1 | Different polycentric structures in three climate-affected regions. (a) A strong and highly decentralized polycentric system in
coastal California (USA), for example, where the open coast and San Francisco Bay area are regulated by entirely different state laws and
governing bodies. The California State Government has historically played an equal or greater agenda-setting role in climate mitigation and
adaptation than the national government; however it is restricted by the significant administrative powers and responsibilities held by the
74 coastal cities and counties.30 (b) The climate-affected Murray–Darling Basin (Australia) covers four states and a federal territory within a
centralizing federal system that is signatory to a number of international conventions.31 This is regarded as a moderate form of polycentrism which
is becoming less polycentric as it centralizes. (c) The climate-exposed North Sea coast of Germany is cooperatively managed by five states and the
national government, which is also a member of the European Union.32 This example is regarded as a nascent form of polycentrism, which is still
subject to issues of fragmentation.
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approach is capable of considering multiple environ-
mental, social, or economic conditions. This flexibility
allows for more democratic representation and legiti-
mization of decisions. Second, because the potential
pathways to solutions of complex problems are ill-
defined, polycentric systems can provide an environ-
ment in which different actors can experiment with
their preferred strategy of adapting to environmental
variability and change. This capacity is also beneficial
from a risk management perspective, because a ‘one-
size-fits all’ approach may fail and this failure may well
have critical adverse implications.28,44 Third, because
the effects of environmental variability and change are
location-specific, a polycentric approach permits tailor-
ing of adaptation activities to suit local-regional cir-
cumstances and community preferences.28,45 Fourth,
polycentric systems allow for specialization and the
division of tasks between central, regional, and local
levels, thus improving the efficiency of adaptation
activities by matching the governance level to the geo-
graphic scale of the problem.33 Fifth, many scholars
believe polycentric systems to be flexible in their ability
to configure and reconfigure alliances rapidly in order
to achieve specific goals, which in turn makes them
inherently adaptive. Sixth, polycentric systems are
regarded as being more robust to external stresses and
shocks because they can recover more quickly due to
their diversity. Their high degree of overlap and redun-
dancy also makes them less vulnerable: if one element
fails, others may take over their functions (although
some scholars have argued that redundancy may coun-
teract nimbleness and flexibility).7,46,47 Finally, in
many policy-making scenarios, the multiple causal fac-
tors and symptoms involved, the high levels of uncer-
tainty about the set of solutions, and the lack of
definitive answer as to who is responsible for the
TABLE 2 | Examples of Dilemmas Posed by the Nature of Climate Variability and Change39–43
• Temporal scale—trade-offs exist between protection of what exists now (infrastructure, economies, and values) and long-term
adaptation. This temporal dimension leads to moral hazard—short-term actions and interventions that compromise, limit, or trade-off
actions in the future (e.g., maladaptation)
• Spatial scale—adaptation actions in one place may have negative impacts elsewhere—either immediately downstream or in more
remote places (e.g., teleconnections)
• Transboundary issues—parts of the environment have shared jurisdiction or where natural resources cross boundaries—such as the
global atmosphere, oceans, various water bodies, and migratory species (e.g., fish stocks)
• Social–ecological interactions—environmental variability inevitably interacts with complex social dynamics, such as place, identity, and
human mobility
• Nonlinear dynamics—social–ecological systems exhibit nonlinear or threshold responses to changes in climate variability
• Cross-scale feedbacks—complex interactions at different spatial or temporal scales generate thresholds and alternate stable states
• Institutional fit—the scale of governance must be capable of responding to the scale of the policy problem
FIGURE 2 | Exponential growth of scientific interest in polycentric governance. Citations to Vincent Ostrom’s seminal article on polycentric
governance7 (black) and published articles on polycentric governance (gray).
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solution mean that a more monocentric approach is
impossible, making polycentricity, in this sense, ‘a fact
of life.’28,48,49
Polycentric governance (along with multilevel,
networked, and fragmented governance) has also
raised well-documented concerns. First, if different
levels of governance opt for conflicting policies, the
result can be leakages, meaningless certification, pol-
icy incoherence, unnecessary duplication of efforts,
counterproductive actions, and/or complete grid-
lock.3,4,28,50 Second, competition between levels
and/or responsibilities spilling over from one level
into another can lead to suboptimal standards for
mitigation and adaptation. For example, when
neighboring communities handle land-use planning
in risk-prone areas loosely in order to attract short-
term-oriented investors, the environmental effects of
these activities may spill over to neighboring
regions.51 Third, in polycentric systems, the costs in
time and money of collective action (consultation,
reaching agreement, and enforcing such agreements)
are high due to the ‘complexity of spatial patterning,
multiple functional overlays, partial polity formation,
and variable system coupling.’5 This cost is especially
high if the basic units in the polycentric system are
very small, requiring the involvement of a larger
number of stakeholders and the need for more infor-
mation.25 Fourth, in a polycentric structure where
responsibilities are very dispersed, new collaborative
processes and organizations such as intergovernmen-
tal committees or specialized agencies are often set
up to steer the system.52,53 Many of these agencies
may prioritize goal achievement over democratic pro-
cedure, circumventing the ‘troublesome’ and ‘time-
consuming’ procedures designed to ensure accounta-
bility and transparency at lower levels.5,19,28,54 Fifth,
polycentric systems are believed to suffer from a ten-
dency for inertia and paralysis, especially when
efforts to preserve the system’s own existence or per-
manence overtake attempts at implementation.55
Sixth, although polycentric systems may be more
robust to external stresses and shocks due to their
diversity, emerging research shows that polycentric
systems are very vulnerable to internal structural and
procedural issues, broader economic factors, and
shifts in political sentiment.8,37 Furthermore, because
polycentric systems appear to be a self-organizing
‘fact of life,’ the opportunities to design and control
such systems are inherently limited.26,33
However, despite progress in understanding
polycentric governance, the lack of comparative and
meta-analysis of the growing library of case studies
suggests that there is much work to be done in resol-
ving potential contradictions and addressing many
contemporary assumptions. In particular, while poly-
centric governance involves both a configuration of
institutions and power, the structural patterns of net-
worked institutions in polycentric systems have
received far more attention than the configuration of
power relations across those structures. This omis-
sion is problematic in that it not only obscures
venues for legitimacy and efficiency in decision-
making but also reproduces unchallenged assump-
tions about the appropriate level and organization of
institutional responses to complex policy problems.46
Structural analyses of networked institutions have
unintentionally downplayed the important role of the
nation state, the powerful private actor, the interna-
tional authority, and the organized bureaucracy, and
left a noticeable gap in the literature on the real
potential for addressing environmental change within
polycentric systems.8,56,57 This bias away from the
nation-state and other powerful actors also pervades
the broader governance literature (see Table 3). It
deserves specific attention because overlooking the
mobilization of power can render mitigation and
adaptation within a polycentric system difficult to
understand and to implement, and may risk reinfor-
cing opposition and hostility toward large-scale
action by particular actors such as nation states.51,58
TABLE 3 | Understanding the Distribution of Power in Contemporary Governance Studies
Key Fields Key Concepts Key Scholars Distribution of Power
International relations Multilateralism, global
governance
Keohane, Nye, Rosenau, Rosendal Upward from nation state
Federalism and EU studies Multilevel governance Scharpf, Borzel, Hooghe and Marks,
Bache and Flinders
Downward from nation state
Political science Decentralization Crook and Manor, Tendler Downward from nation state
Public policy and
administration
Network governance,
fragmented governance
Peters and Pierre, Rhodes, Bell and
Hindmoor, Jessop
Sideways from nation state
Institutional economics Polycentric governance V. Ostrom, E. Ostrom, McGinnis Upward, downward, and sideways
from nation state
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Understanding adaptation in polycentric sys-
tems is easier if we understand the system not only as
a set of institutions, agencies, and actors but also as
an expression of power-laden social relations that
affect both adaptive capacities and policy implemen-
tation.18,57 Indeed, all governance involves the redis-
tribution of power. Effective governance can thus be
supported or resisted, depending on the normative
agenda of the actors involved and whether that
agenda is advanced by polycentrism. But what
enables these different actors to wield power, and to
prevent or encourage the competitive (and potentially
maladaptive) behavior of other actors?
LOCATING POWER AND AUTHORITY
IN POLYCENTRIC CLIMATE
GOVERNANCE
While there are many theories of power they all con-
verge in highlighting that power is unevenly distribu-
ted and socially contested, with consequences for the
creation and distribution of resources, opportunities
and well-being.59–62 Theories diverge in their empha-
sis on individual and collective dimensions, on how
power is active and observable or alternatively hid-
den and slippery, and on how the consequences of
the exercise of power are deliberate or largely unin-
tended.63 Many social science theories and analyses
of environmental governance illuminate divergent
aspects of power, distinguishing between, for exam-
ple, institutional, social, reputational, framing, politi-
cal, legal, rational, relational, and practical aspects,
as well as between power and agency.14,64–69 These
categories are not mutually exclusive and may be
fluid. They are often developed in a pragmatic fash-
ion to help identify the aspects of power that affect,
distort, and often undermine the fundamental goals
of governance. Yet, there is surprisingly little work
drawing these aspects together into a comprehensive
typology (but see Ref 61). Table 4 presents such a
framework: it identifies three comprehensive cate-
gories of power that we argue most frequently shape
governance. Our categorization focuses on how
power varies according to the authority to make
decisions and distribute resources (power by design),
to administer and implement rules (pragmatic
power), and to interpret knowledge and set norms
(framing power). For each of these categories, power
is a relational concept because it only emerges
through interactions and cannot always be retrieved
by looking solely at certain individual interactions or
exchanges. Rather, it is precisely the iterative nature
of these interactions that leads to the establishment
of certain reputations, network structures, institu-
tional arrangements, or principles. In this sense,
power has an emergent property and actors behave
in a certain way not only because they are powerful
but also because they want to become more powerful
or stay as powerful as they have been. Similarly, the
balance of power can shift, sometimes quickly and
dramatically, from actor to actor or organization to
organization. In the following, we discuss the differ-
ent types of power, the causes and consequences of
asymmetric power, and the implications of unveiling
such asymmetries. Because power is not easy to
observe and measure70 we also provide examples of
typical methods of measurement.
Power by Design
A governance regime is often defined by how its
decision-making powers are distributed among actors
at different levels. These powers can be constitution-
ally guaranteed (e.g., in a federation) and distributed
jurisdictionally (e.g., devolution of decision-making
powers to lower levels of actors). The concentration
of power can be dispersed by actions such as estab-
lishing regional organizations for environmental
management or the creation of semi-autonomous
agencies, commissions, or statutory authorities
headed by appointees of the decision-making author-
ity. A redistribution of power is thus the outcome of
such vertical deconcentration or delegation.
In polycentric governance, high-level actors,
trans-national commissions, governments, and multi-
lateral organizations usually have some but limited
decision-making power. Decision-making power in
this context refers not only to the ability to legislate
and allocate resources, but also to undertake struc-
tural adjustment, redesign markets, and regulate
externalities.71 More often than not, states play a
dominant role by retaining ultimate control over criti-
cal environmental resources such as water and forests.
Extensive research has shown how states tend to
retain power even where they apparently devolve
power to lower levels of decision making, and in their
efforts to seek to correct and limit elite capture, and
prevent the overuse and illegal use of resources.65,72
One of the goals of polycentric regimes is pre-
cisely to redistribute decision-making power to other
actors and levels of government,67 yet such devolu-
tion is rare in practice.73,74 State-centered governance
regimes routinely exercise power by design in appar-
ently polycentric systems. Sovacool,38 for example,
shows how a key element in successful polycentric
approaches to energy and climate governance in Den-
mark, Brazil, Bangladesh, and China was ‘a central
WIREs Climate Change Mitigation and adaptation in polycentric systems
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state willing to levy taxes, implement regulations,
and invest in innovation—purposefully manipulating
markets to change technologies and behaviours’
(p. 3842). Similarly, in the case of the Australian
Murray–Darling River Basin, which spans across sev-
eral states, the national government has drawn upon
its power to enforce treaties (the international RAM-
SAR convention on wetlands) in order to impose a
new national law, and thereby override political
maneuvering by lower levels of government and
other stakeholders.31 The fiscal dependence of the
states on the national government has provided the
national government with considerable political lev-
erage in the Basin75 and consequently decision-
making power has become increasingly centralized in
order to enhance the Basin’s resilience to climate
change.
Decision-making power within other poly-
centric regimes assumes different forms and reach. In
the state of California, while decision-making power
for coastal climate adaptation is the responsibility of
the state, the national USA Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act 1972 rewards coastal states for developing
and implementing state-level coastal regulatory pro-
grams.30 However, federal agencies must conduct
their activities (including federal development pro-
jects, permits, and licenses, and assistance to state
and local governments) in a manner consistent with
the state program.30 As a result, decision-making
power for adaptation on the California coast is far
more decentralized than in many other cases, with
more powers attached to lower levels.76 Likewise, the
central German government has fostered a soft
national strategy relevant to adaptation on the Ger-
man North Sea coast that has been developed in a
consultative mode with the states (the Lander), the
European Union, and other adjacent European coun-
tries. The Lander shares responsibility with the
national government for decision-making and deliv-
ery in this arena but is reluctant to take over new
and additional tasks without sufficient compensation
for associated expenditures.51,77,78 The federal gov-
ernment provides up to 70% of the funding of capi-
tal costs for coastal protection infrastructure and the
states contribute the remaining 30%.
In effect, fiscal power, administrative power,
and the power to make meaningful decisions con-
tinue to comprise the most visible manifestation of
power in polycentric regimes. Indicators such as the
size and hierarchical arrangement of organizational
structures and the receipt and distribution of organi-
zational resources at different levels can reveal
administrative and fiscal power. Similarly, the distri-
bution of decision-making power can be revealed
through analysis of relevant institutional arrange-
ments (Table 4).
Pragmatic Power
Pragmatic power refers to the exercise of functional
powers by different actors through their influence on
day-to-day decisions. In contrast to the formal and
more visible nature of power by design, pragmatic
power resides in how organizations and actors
TABLE 4 | Sources of Power and Authority in Governance Systems
Power by Design Pragmatic Power Framing Power
Definition Formal authority with capacity
to make rules, allocate
resources, undertake structural
adjustment, redesign markets
and administrative structures,
to tax, and regulate resource
use and externalities. Includes
legal power, political power,
administrative power, and
institutional power
Primarily informal authority with
capacity to interpret, certify,
and monitor rules, influence
other actors, control
information, to ‘govern by
doing’ through the day-to-day
implementation of governance
mechanisms. Includes practical
power, social power,
reputational power, and
mediating power
Often invisible authority with
capacity to develop codified
rules and knowledge, to
frame problems, construct
issues and set norms.
Includes discursive power
and epistemic power
Examples of typical
methods of measurement
Documentary analysis of
relevant institutional
arrangements, receipt and
distribution of fiscal resources;
employee and budget
numbers in organizational
documents (qualitative and
quantitative)
Qualitative survey of legal
interpretation and
bureaucratic perception; in-
depth qualitative studies of
practitioners, combining
significant periods of
observation with multiple
interviews
Discourse analysis of key texts;
process tracing of paradigm
changes; qualitative
assessment of disciplinary
expertise; ethnographies;
analysis of qualifications and
professional standing of
personnel
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influence both the decision-making context and
implementation process. There is substantial evidence
on how bottom-up policy is implemented: analysis of
network governance, for example, shows the infor-
mal yet legitimate ways in which street-level bureau-
crats and noncentralized organizations exert power
through the implementation of formal rules and
norms set by others.79,80 Power materializes, for
example, in the interpretation of guidelines, the
undertaking of performance evaluation, the solving
of problems, and the actual implementation of gov-
ernance mechanisms. High- and local-level bureau-
cracies and nonstate actors such as corporations and
activist groups are in effect pragmatic power-
brokers.53,65,81
Shadow and dormant networks of pragmatic
power-brokers can mobilize pragmatic power very
rapidly when necessary.82 Indeed, one key element of
polycentric governance systems is that in order to
function properly, the various governance sites and
levels need to be connected. For instance, from the
perspective of learning (the spreading of ‘best prac-
tices’ from elsewhere) and mutual adjustment, local
sites need to be connected with each other and the
overall experiences of various localities needs to
assessed at a higher level. In addition, some level of
vision building at the higher-level needs to guide local
experimentation. Networks of leaders, entrepreneurs
and/or other ‘elite agents’ mobilize their unique abil-
ities and qualities (e.g., charisma) and the place they
occupy in networks in order to pragmatically deter-
mine choices.35,83
Examples of the exercise of pragmatic power
within polycentric systems include the California
Coastal Commission, mandated by the California
Coastal Act. While it exercises high decision-making
power over adaptation in the state’s coastal zone,
pragmatic power over local planning decisions actu-
ally resides at the city and county level under the
rubric of state environmental planning law.84 Simi-
larly, in Brazil’s decentralized water management,
well-connected members of river basin committees
(constituted of representative users, state officials,
and others) exert de facto pragmatic power in gov-
ernance of climate impacts by circumventing mem-
bership rules established to prevent long-term
accumulation of power. Since membership represent-
ing any sector is limited to two years, well-connected
actors are able to extend their influence by negotiat-
ing representation with a different sector every time
their membership expires. On the one hand, these
actors have been able to exert considerable power
over decisions at the expense of broader representa-
tion, whereas on the other hand, they have played
pivotal roles in guarding institutional memory and
continuity.57,85 In Indonesia, powerful organizations
use their reputational power to influence decisions in
the implementation of climate mitigation schemes
such as REDD+, especially by controlling the
exchange of information across levels, which is usu-
ally out of reach for other organizations because of
the high transaction costs it involves.14
In seeking to understand and measure prag-
matic power, it is possible to study legal interpreta-
tion and bureaucratic perception of who has the
power to influence the decision-making context and
then interpret, certify, and monitor policy priorities,
adaptation frameworks, and compliance.65,86,87 This
kind of information can be elicited through docu-
mentary or archival review (e.g., of organizational
annual reports), key informant interviews, and sur-
veys of participants in polycentric governance pro-
cesses (e.g., to gauge access to formal political power,
and patronage relationships involving key agencies
and politicians) (Table 4).
Framing Power
Framing power is realized when individuals, institu-
tions, and organizations have the ability to frame
problems and set norms.88 In polycentric systems,
this kind of power can skew authority and set agen-
das, especially if technical knowledge is uncontested
and perceived as superior to other forms of knowl-
edge.86,89 Framing power-brokers produce codified
rules over areas of knowledge (traditionally in engi-
neering, science, economics, medicine, and law) and
are typically evident by the existence of a large, well-
funded, and well-educated constituency with concrete
discernible interests, broader political support, and
the public good plans and initiatives that emanate
from this support.90 In the environmental domain,
engineering and forestry experts in the US Corps of
Engineers and the US Forest Service, for example, are
classic examples of significant actors wielding great
framing power.86
In California in the 1980s, state agencies that
were dominated by legal experts interpreted separate
provisions of the California Coastal Act to allow
shoreline defense for existing structures in imminent
danger from coastal erosion. As a result, seawalls
became the most common form of coastal defense
(and approximately 12% of the California coastline
was engineered) while other states such as Oregon,
Maine, and North Carolina have partial or full sea-
wall prohibitions in place. While institutional and
attitudinal barriers to climate adaptation still exist
today at the local and state level, the California Ocean
WIREs Climate Change Mitigation and adaptation in polycentric systems
Volume 8, September/October 2017 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 9 of 16
Protection Council, the Coastal Commission, and the
California State Coastal Conservancy are working to
reframe the problem and set new norms, this time
focusing on soft approaches to coastal defenses.91,92
In Brazil’s decentralized water management sys-
tem, technocrats (técnicos) frequently mobilize ‘apo-
litical’ scientific information to increase regional
decision-making capacity and policy implementation.
By controlling the production and access to knowl-
edge (e.g., climate forecasts) these technocrats are
able to insulate decisions from river basin committee
members and drive different agendas. For example,
in dry north-eastern Brazil, técnicos have been able
to prioritize a highly risk-averse agenda for water
management that favors ecosystem health, whereas
in the relatively water-rich south-east, hydropower
companies dominate decision-making at the expense
of other water users.89 Here, environmental out-
comes appear to be predicated by the value systems
and interests of these técnicos and their organizations
rather than by established governance goals.
Similarly, until the 1990s, the framing of water
variability in the Murray–Darling Basin in Australia
was exerted by government agencies dominated by
engineering experts who were largely concerned with
the construction of public works to manage flows
and store water for irrigation purposes. More
recently, it has become clear that the expansion of
irrigation has long exceeded sustainable limits.93 The
architects of the subsequent Draft Basin Plan (the
ministerial council) successfully shifted the para-
meters of the debate from a sole focus on the socioec-
onomic viability of irrigated agriculture communities
to a new focus that included environmental sustaina-
bility in a changing climate.94
In the international polycentric system for
water governance,95,96 much of the global debate on
managing the effects of climate change takes place in
fora such as the World Bank, where countries rather
than individual farmers are represented, and where
some countries are much more capable of steering
the debate than others because they have more
resources for representation at that forum.97 Subse-
quently, ideas emanating from wealthier countries
are adopted, and the policies of international organi-
zations reflect the priorities of those countries. This
dominance has consequences. For example, where
the help of international organizations is sought
(e.g., in the form of a loan for the development of
critical infrastructure), specific policies must be
accepted as a condition for financial aid and re-
applied in situations which are inappropriate.98
Strong framing power can emerge from a per-
suasive base of disciplinary expertise in a highly
regarded profession, including at the leadership
level.86 Framing power can be elicited through
records of organizational workforce (e.g., annual
reports) which usually indicate not only the total
number of personnel but also the professional base
of that personnel in terms of qualifications and disci-
plinary mix. The distribution of framing power can
also be analyzed in terms of the existence of concrete
groups (e.g., nonprofit organizations and intergov-
ernmental groups) and their involvement in setting
the agenda for public-good plans and initiatives. This
distribution can be understood through documentary
review (e.g., discourse analysis of key texts and proc-
ess tracing of paradigm changes), qualitative assess-
ment of disciplinary expertise, ethnographies, and
participant observation, and quantitative analysis of
number of personnel with advanced or professional
qualifications (Table 4).
Causes and Consequences of Asymmetric
Power Distribution in Polycentric Climate
Governance
The different types of power identified above are nei-
ther static, nor are they evenly distributed. Indeed,
scholars of power have long questioned ideals about
stable and balanced power, favoring more fluid and
asymmetric understanding. Empirical research show
that asymmetries in the distribution of power ema-
nate from different sources, including disparities in
wealth, education, rights, representation, information
access and control, patronage, and military might.
These asymmetries are further obscured by recent
trends in the decentralization, technocratization, mar-
ketization, and privatization of environmental gov-
ernance, which have increased the reach of private
and NGO power, but without the traditional
accountability and legitimacy checks of the demo-
cratic state.99,100 And, despite the distributed power
ideal, polycentric governance of climate, rather than
being immune to these asymmetries, is as vulnerable
to them as other forms of governance. For example,
recent research has shown how the asymmetric quali-
ties of power, when left unchecked, can affect the
outcomes of polycentric governance. Unchecked
power imbalances in polycentric governance of
REDD+ and the Global Environment Facility’s Least
Developed Countries Fund have skewed stakeholder
representation and risk, reinforcing preexisting elites
while further marginalizing the vulnerable.14,38 Unac-
countable private and NGO influence, combined
with general retreat of state responsibility for public
goods and services, can have serious implications for
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both climate mitigation and adaption, both in terms
of capacities and policy implementation.37,101
Methods for Unveiling the Dimensions of
Power
We have argued above that while polycentric climate
governance clearly involves both a configuration of
institutions and power, the structural patterns of net-
worked institutions in polycentric systems have
received far more attention than the configuration of
asymmetric power relations across those structures.
This emphasis on network structure has led to an
overconcentration on power by design. Yet, under-
standing adaptation and mitigation in polycentric
systems is easier if we understand the system not only
as a decentralized networks of cooperative learning
across institutions, agencies, and actors, but also as
an expression of power-laden social relations.18 This
understanding illuminates other less visible forms of
power such as pragmatic power and framing power.
We suggest here that these less visible forms may be
the more dominant modes through which collective
goals in polycentric systems are sought and some-
times achieved. Unveiling such power dynamics is
not easy.70 Power dynamics will always vary on a
case-by-case basis and may involve tangible (time,
money, and financial) and intangible (trust and legiti-
macy) transaction costs. However, if we want to
improve the design and outcomes of polycentric gov-
ernance in any meaningful way, we need to identify
and understand the (negative and positive) roles
power can play. Here, we have provided examples of
typical methods of observation and measurement
that are applicable across cases.
Attention to these different types of power
offers new promise for governing complex environ-
mental problems, in a number of ways. First, by
revealing the different types of power, governance
actors can assess power dynamics and how asymme-
tries can increase the risks for corruption and other
abuses of power (such as closed-door deals, conflicts
of interest, illegal finance, and patchy law enforce-
ment). Here, knowledge can empower actors and
help them to influence others.100 Such actions can
include exposing asymmetric power dynamics
through new information, advocating changes to
societal norms or government and industry policies
or rules, mobilizing new interest groups and coali-
tions, and generating other forms of countervailing
power.48,102,103 For example, in the Brazilian water
management example, técnicos have been able to use
climate information as leverage to curb both eco-
nomic and political power within river basin
committees.89 Fung104 also describes, for example,
the generation of a ‘civic immune system’ whereby
an ecology of transparency, accountability, and mon-
itoring mechanisms and associations can monitor
and disclose information to enhance democracy and
seek to limit major abuses of power. These mechan-
isms and associations include public, private, and
nonprofit mechanisms and associations which seek to
audit, verify, and certify, such as traditional govern-
ment audit offices and commissions, private certifiers,
and nonprofit organizations (e.g., Transparency
International, the Sunlight Foundation in the United
States, and GetUp in Australia). These mechanisms
and associations can and do work together to consti-
tute new forms of countervailing power, with the
potential to correct or at least keep in check the nega-
tive consequences of power asymmetry and abuse in
polycentric climate governance.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF A
POWER-CENTERED FRAMEWORK
Models and theories of polycentric governance are
making substantial headway on issues of innovation,
trust, scale, and knowledge.8,105–108 Here we empha-
size that all of these issues are illuminated by inclu-
sion of power dynamics and that such inclusion
increases the explanatory power of these models. We
argue that while dominant conceptualizations of
polycentric governance provide useful insights into
the potential for climate mitigation and adaptation,
present models downplay the powerful roles of
higher levels including those of the nation state, as
well as the more diffuse exercise of power at lower
levels of governance. We are not implying that the
state always plays the most powerful hand or that
there is an underlying model for how power should
be most effectively structured. Indeed, decades of
research on federalism, decentralization, and interna-
tional relations have shown that even in the presence
of strong systems, horizontal and vertical coopera-
tion is difficult.76,109,110 Rather, we argue that it is
critical to understand how different actors mobilize
power and authority in polycentric systems in order
to bring about transformational change.
Many studies of polycentrism focus on visible
examples of decentralization and experimentation.
These are often presented as complex yet politically
benign structures; for example, network structures
that rely on soft interventions such as information
sharing, devolution of responsibilities, and fiscal
incentives. Yet, despite their complexity and benign
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appearance, polycentric governance systems continue
to emerge spontaneously in response to environmen-
tal dilemmas and are often exciting in terms of how
they invoke different sources of power to achieve or
avoid collective goals. In our categorization, we sug-
gest that pragmatic power and framing power may
be the dominant modes through which collective
goals in polycentric systems are sought and some-
times achieved.
We have highlighted how three specific ele-
ments of power—power by design, pragmatic power,
and framing power—imbue different levels of actors
and arrangements with the authority to realize collec-
tive goals in polycentric governance systems. Further
research is needed to explore many of the issues
raised in this review. First, it is important to be clear
and specific on what makes polycentric governance
distinctive, and to identify how embedded and preva-
lent it is in all governance structures. Second, it is
necessary to track how power dynamics within poly-
centric governance systems change over time. A sig-
nificant research task is the development of methods
capable of monitoring different elements of power.
Many policy analyses focus on short time frames of
four to six years.80 However, we suggest that a
longer time frame is more suitable for an analysis of
the capillary nature of power as it shifts over
time.37,59,69 A third analytical task suggested by our
review is the clarification of causality in study design:
is power an inevitable outcome of governance struc-
tures or independent of such structures?111 Settling
such methodological questions would facilitate the
building of a significant evidence base on the pres-
ence, effectiveness, and distributional impacts of
polycentric governance. There is also the more nor-
mative question of how power should be most effec-
tively structured in particular polycentric systems; for
instance, should it be evenly distributed, or should
the weakest actors have veto power? These are
important questions for further research.
At the heart of this scientific debate is the
issue of whether interactions between different
actors in polycentric systems actually improve the
prospects of dealing with the dilemmas of climate
change. The promise is that polycentric systems
bridge the divide between hierarchical structures
and the lack of agency involved in both adaptation
and mitigation efforts. By promoting detailed analy-
sis of power, we argue that the failures of poly-
centric systems to deliver on their promise can be
at least partially explained, and perhaps that recog-
nizing such power can aid in better governance to
avoid the constraints and pitfalls of the capture of
structure by certain interests. Ultimately, future
development, implementation, and practice would
be enhanced by recognizing how power is mobilized
to achieve goals, and in whose interest it is
exercised.
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